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Executive Summary
Brazil entered the new millennium with a stabi­
lized economy and a better-nourished popula­
tion enjoying greater access to health care and 
education than in the past. Economic growth 
and a strong government commitment to 
decreasing poverty and inequality during the 
first decade of the 2000s made it possible for 
Brazil to anticipate achievement of the Millen­
nium Development goal of reducing extreme 
poverty by half by 2015 [CONSEA 2009a, b], 
with a concomitant 25 percent decrease in the 
prevalence of hunger [IBGE 2010a], A major 
factor in these advances was the Zero Hunger 
strategy, composed of an integrated set of 
actions spanning 19 ministries and secretariats, 
with poverty alleviation serving as one key 
aspect of a much broader approach to promot­
ing food and nutrition security.
Aiming to consolidate the gains of the past 
decade, the president of Brazil signed a presiden­
tial decree in August 2010 outlining directives 
for the development of a National Food and 
Nutrition Security Plan and other steps neces­
sary to implement the National Food and Nutri­
tion Security System, founded on decentralized 
policy implementation and decision making. 
More than two decades of social mobilization to 
fight hunger and a constitutional commitment 
to decentralized decision making, combined with 
the concerted effort on the part of government 
and civil society during the past decade, have 
laid the groundwork for a decentralized food 
and nutrition security system.
The federal government's intersectoral approach 
and close collaboration with the National Coun­
cil on Food and Nutrition Security [CONSEA], 
an advisory council with a direct institutional 
link to the executive branch and broad repre­
sentation from civil society as well as key gov­
ernment sectors and programs, has proven to 
be a successful model at the federal level. The 
challenge now is to replicate this model at the 
state and local levels, define responsibilities of 
the three levels of government, and find the 
right balance of inducements and obligations.
The presidential decree charges an inter- 
ministerial governmental body with formulating 
the first National Food and Nutrition Security
Plan, followed by the promotion of state and 
municipal food and nutrition security plans. 
Although the federal government is committed 
to decentralized control and recognizes that too 
many rules and regulations can interfere with 
the flexibility needed to adapt to local political- 
institutional arrangements, it requires instru­
ments to fulfill its mandate to implement the law 
and monitor actions at the local level. What 
directives and instruments would you recom­
mend be included in the national plan to meet 
this challenge?
Background
National Advances and Regional 
Differences
Brazil is larger in area than the continental 
United States and equally varied in culture, 
topography, and natural resources, with a pop­
ulation of more than 190 million. Although a 
growing number of people reside in urban 
areas—84 percent according to the 2010 census 
[IBGE 2010b]—the majority of the more than 
five thousand municipalities are small and 
strongly influenced by rural dynamics.
Health and living conditions have improved 
significantly over the past 20 years for the 
general population, but considerable inequalities 
remain, exacerbated by regional differences. The 
south and southeastern regions, where the 
major financial and industrial centers of Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo are located, are more 
prosperous and enjoy better infrastructure. The 
north and northeast, which include the Amazon 
and the semi-arid region, are characterized by 
less-developed infrastructure and industry, a 
more dispersed population, fewer public ser­
vices, and much higher rates of poverty, 
particularly in rural areas.
Overall poverty fell from 20 to 7 percent of the 
population in just five years, between 2004 and 
2009 [measured according to the World Bank 
indicator of $2.00 per capita per day].l More
1 The Brazilian measure of poverty is closer to $4.00 
per person per day [half a minimum monthly salary
significantly, extreme poverty [$1.25 per day] 
dropped from 10 to 4 percent of the population 
in the same period, as income for the lowest 10 
percent of the population grew at four times 
the rate of that for the wealthiest decile [World 
Bank 2010], However, 2010 data reveal stark 
regional differences, with incidences of extreme 
poverty of 16.8 and 18.1 percent in the north and 
northeast, respectively, compared with 2.6 and 
3.4 in the south and southeast [MDS 2011],
As would be expected, these socioeconomic 
advances were accompanied by significant 
changes in the nutritional profile of the popula­
tion and a marked decrease in hunger and food 
insecurity. In recent decades Brazil, like many 
emerging economies, has experienced rapid 
declines in undernutrition and an increase in 
overweight, obesity, and associated chronic 
diseases, particularly among the poor, in a phe­
nomenon known as the nutrition transition 
[Batista Filho and Rissin 2003; IBGE 2004; 
Mondini and Gimeno 2011],
This problematic association between anthropo­
metric indicators of nutritional status and 
income level, both common proxy measures of 
hunger, reinforces the importance of a direct 
measure of the experience of hunger at the 
household level. A national survey included a 
Brazilian adaptation of the U.S. Household Food 
Security Measure developed by Segall-Correa et 
al. (2009), and the results showed a 25 per­
cent decrease in hunger (severe food insecurity) 
from 2004 to 2009. Food insecurity among 
Brazilians living in extreme poverty fell by 50 
percent. Although the most significant advances 
occurred in the poorer regions of the country, 
pronounced regional differences remain, with 
much higher rates of moderate and severe food 
insecurity in the north and northeast [18.6 and 
22.2 percent, respectively) than in the south and 
southeast (5.0 and 7.3 percent, respectively] 
(IBGE 2010a).
Well-targeted social programs composing a 
broad intersectoral strategy have played a key 
role in decreasing hunger and promoting 
greater equality and upward mobility and have 
been allied with significant job creation and
per family member). According to the Brazilian census 
bureau, the poverty rate fell from 32.4 to 22.6 
percent of families from 2 0 0 0  to 2010 (IBGE 2010b).
higher real wages.2 The main income transfer 
program implemented in 2003, the Bolsa Familia 
(Family Grant) Program, currently provides 
modest cash benefits to 13 million low-income 
families—essentially all of those living in extreme 
poverty—on the condition that they keep their 
children in school, keep their children's vaccina­
tions up to date, and make monthly visits to the 
public health clinic for child growth monitoring 
and health checkups. However, this high-profile 
program is only one government initiative 
among nearly 30 that compose the Zero 
Hunger strategy.
The Anti-Hunger Movement in Brazil 
and the Zero Hunger Strategy
Since the early 1990s, actions aimed at ending 
hunger in Brazil have been driven by networks 
of well-organized social movements allied with 
religious leaders and members of academic 
communities from diverse fields. These networks 
pushed food security onto the public policy 
agenda, and in 1993 the first National Council 
on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) was 
formed. Although this CONSEA had a short 
political life, social movements and institutions 
continued to mobilize around the issue of 
hunger and food security, and when Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva assumed the presidency in 2003, he 
declared ending hunger to be his government's 
number-one priority.
An Extraordinary Ministry of Food and Nutri­
tion Security was formed in 2003 to implement 
what became known as the Zero Hunger Strat­
egy. One year later, however, aiming to improve 
integration of poverty and hunger alleviation 
policies and programs, the government merged 
this ministry with the Ministry of Social Assis­
tance and the Executive Secretariat of the Inter- 
ministerial Council of Bolsa Familia. The result­
ing Ministry of Social Development and Fight 
against Hunger [MDS] is currently composed of 
five national secretariats: Food and Nutrition 
Security; Social Assistance [responsible for over­
seeing the Unified Social Assistance System); 
Income for Citizenship [responsible for manag­
ing the Bolsa Familia Program); Institutional 
Articulation for Productive Inclusion; and 
Evaluation and Information Management. The
2 The real value of the official minimum wage 
increased 50 percent from 2003  to 2010.
creation of the latter—an internal evaluation 
unit to monitor program implementation and 
effectiveness, with status equal to that of the 
other secretariats—was an unprecedented inno­
vation. Another successful innovation was the 
appointment of a special Zero Hunger adviser to 
the Minister of Social Development to oversee 
the integration of the ministry's food and nutri­
tion security [FNS] actions with those being car­
ried out by ministries and institutions outside 
the MDS.
Another of the president's first acts upon 
assuming office was to reestablish the CONSEA 
as an advisory council with a direct institutional 
link to the executive branch and broad repre­
sentation from social movements, nongovern­
mental organizations, the private sector, univer­
sities, and research institutions, together with 
representatives from key government sectors 
and programs. The president and two-thirds of 
the members of the CONSEA are representa­
tives of civil society, and one-third is composed 
of government representatives. The CONSEA 
was integrally involved in planning and moni­
toring the Zero Hunger strategy and has been a 
proponent and overseer of policies and legal 
landmarks to promote and protect the human 
right to adequate food, which was incorporated 
into the Brazilian Constitution in 2009. It oper­
ates as an effective network of policy communi­
ties and a space for participatory democracy 
where diverse stakeholder perspectives and 
interests are debated. These debates result in 
propositions that are presented to the executive 
branch, which in turn demands a response from 
government officials, many of whom are also 
participating members of the CONSEA. Mem­
bers gather regularly in Brasilia for working 
group meetings and plenary sessions and are an 
essential source of feedback "from the field" for 
government decision makers regarding FNS 
policies and programs.
One of the most important challenges of the 
national CONSEA is to foster state and local 
participation in FNS policy through the promo­
tion of state and municipal FNS advisory coun­
cils. Policy advisory councils are a familiar fea­
ture of the political landscape in Brazil, which 
has cultivated participatory democracy through 
such councils and often requires their existence 
as a condition for receiving federal funds in 
areas such as health, education, culture, and
social services. Municipal participation in the 
Bolsa Fami'lia Program [BFP] is conditional on the 
existence of a local advisory council to monitor 
its implementation, for example.
What distinguishes FNS policy from these oth­
ers, however, is the degree to which it relies on 
policies and actions in a diversity of other sec­
tors, requiring a high level of cooperation 
among autonomous departments, often with 
little history of collaboration. This was but one 
of the many challenges faced by national deci­
sion makers charged with the task of consoli­
dating and institutionalizing the advances of the 
past eight years through the development of the 
recently launched National FNS Plan and con­
struction of a National Food and Nutrition 
Security System.
The National Food and Nutrition 
Security System
The National Food and Nutrition Security Sys­
tem [SISAN] was instituted in 2006 with the 
passage of the National Food and Nutrition 
Security Law of 2006 [Lei Organica de 
Seguranqa Alimentar e Nutricional]. The defini­
tion of food and nutrition security adopted in 
the law is as follows:
The realization of everyone's right to 
regular and permanent access to enough 
food of good quality without compro­
mising access to other basic necessities, 
and based on food practices that pro­
mote health, respect cultural diversity, 
and are environmentally, culturally, eco­
nomically, and socially sustainable.
The breadth of this definition is reflected in the 
Zero Hunger strategy, which includes poverty 
alleviation as part of a broader approach that 
spans everything from sustainable economic and 
agricultural practices to nutrition knowledge and 
food habits.
SISAN objectives, according to the law, include 
formulation and implementation of FNS policies 
and plans, stimulation of the integration of the 
efforts of government and civil society, and 
promotion, monitoring, and evaluation of FNS 
throughout the country. The presidential 
decree, signed in August 2010, stipulates that
this is to be accomplished through intersectoral 
policies and actions executed by the government 
as well as nongovernmental organizations 
through decentralized decision making and col­
laboration among the three levels of govern­
ment. This decentralized approach involving 
pacts between the national, state, and municipal 
governments is a reflection of the federalist sys­
tem, which was consolidated in the 1988 
Constitution.
The law also defines the components of the 
SISAN and their respective responsibilities:
1. The National FNS Conference. Organized 
by the CONSEA every four years, the con­
ference is responsible for defining directives 
and priorities for National FNS Policy. 
Participants are delegates from local and 
regional FNS councils, with broad represen­
tation from social movements and local 
organizations and institutions, governmental 
and nongovernmental.
2. The CONSEA. The CONSEA is respon­
sible for presenting the proposals resulting 
from the National FNS Conference to the 
executive branch as well as monitoring the 
implementation of the FNS actions in colla­
boration with the other components of the 
SISAN. It is also responsible for establishing 
permanent mechanisms of communication 
with institutions and organizations engaged 
in FNS activities at the state and local level 
to promote dialogue and integration of FNS 
actions.
3. The Interministerial FN S Chamber [Camara 
Interministerial de Seguranga Alim entar e 
Nutricional, or CAISANJ. This government 
body, composed of representatives of 19 
ministries and special secretariats whose 
actions interface with FNS policies, is 
responsible for formulating, implementing, 
and monitoring the National FNS Plan based 
on directives emanating from the CONSEA.
4. Government institutions at the national, 
state, and municipal levels whose actions 
interface with FN S policies and programs.
5. Private nonprofit social assistance organi­
zations and other nongovernmental
organizations that are interested in being 
part o f the system.
Guiding principles of the SISAN include univer­
sal access; preservation of people's autonomy 
and dignity; social participation in the formula­
tion, execution, and monitoring of FNS plans 
and policies at all levels of government; and 
transparency.
Brazil's systemic approach to FNS policy, which 
acknowledges the interdependence and mutual 
relations among the multiple factors that affect 
FNS at different levels of society, follows a pat­
tern set in other policy areas in that country. 
Many examples of decentralized government 
systems are already in place, including the Uni­
fied Health System and the Unified Social Assis­
tance System. What distinguishes the SISAN 
from these important precedents is that it is not 
autonomous with respect to goals, institutional 
structure and resources, but rather depends on 
cooperation among associated systems, most of 
which have their own spaces for social participa­
tion [Maluf 2009], SISAN operates by organiz­
ing and monitoring actions in many govern­
mental and nongovernmental sectors and inte­
grating them into a FNS policy [Burlandy 2009], 
Thus, the SISAN outlines directives and pro­
poses integrated actions based upon a complex 
dialogue involving participants from other sys­
tems, each with their own autonomous decision­
making processes.
The "open" nature of this system [Maluf 2009; 
MDS 2008) makes it difficult to impose 
standards, establish clear lines of authority and 
funding, and form an integrated strategy out of 
the multiple parts. Whereas the MDS is respon­
sible for many of the main FNS programs that 
make up the system, some key elements, such as 
the National School Meals Program, the Pro­
gram to Strengthen Family Farming, and various 
programs specific to nutrition (monitoring, edu­
cation, and nutritional supplementation), pertain 
to other ministries (Education, Agrarian Devel­
opment, and Health, respectively). An overview 
of the policies and programs aimed at promot­
ing food and nutrition security appears in 
Table 1.
Table 1: Program s and A ctio n s Corresponding to D ifferent Dim ensions o f Food Security
Program Ministries responsible
Dimensions 1 and 2: Food production and availability
National Program to Strengthen Family Farming MDA
Family Farming Food Procurement Program [Programa de MDS/MAPA/MDA
Aquisiqao de Alimentos -  PAA]
Minimum price guarantee MAPA
Produce and Livestock Market Modernization Program MAPA
Agrarian reform MDA
Agro-biodiversity Program MMA
Fishing and aquaculture MPA
Dimension 3: income/access and food expenditures
Bolsa Fami'Iia income transfer program MDS
Disability benefits MDS
Social security benefits Ministry of Social Security
Minimum wage policy MTE
Dimension 4: Access to adequate food
National School Meals Program [universally available in public Ministry of Education
schools]
Food for specific population groups [indigenous populations, MDS / MAPA /
homeless rural workers, and other vulnerable groups] Ministry of National Integration
Rainwater catchment cisterns MDS
Very low-cost popular restaurants MDS
Food banks MDS
Community kitchens MDS
Supplementary food program for workers MTE
Dimension 5: Health and access to health services
Vitamin A and iron supplementation Ministry of Health
Promotion of healthy eating habits and lifestyle Ministry of Health
Family Health Program Ministry of Health
Child Immunization Program Ministry of Health
Sanitation and water Ministry of Health
Dimension 6: Education
Literacy programs Ministry of Education
Basic education policy Ministry of Education
Dimension 7: Traditional populations
Traditional communities Ministry of Justice
Regularization of landownership of traditional communities Ministry of Justice/MDA
Food security and sustainability in indigenous populations MMA
Source: C O N SEA  2010.
Note: M A P A  = Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply; M D A  = Ministry of Agrarian Development; M DS = 
Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger; M M A  = Ministry of the Environment; M P A  = Ministry 
of Fishing and Aquaculture; M TE = Ministry of W ork and Employment.
Many of the programs listed in Table 1 have a 
well-defined, consolidated institutional structure. 
Others, however, depend on much more 
heterogeneous or intersectoral institutional 
arrangements. The BFP, for example, has a well 
defined and effective operational structure 
directed by the MDS but depends on the educa­
tion and health sectors to monitor families' 
compliance with conditionalities for receiving 
the benefits.
One of the most innovative and complex pro­
grams is the Family Farming Food Procurement 
Program [PAA], which pays smallholder farmers 
a fair price for the food they produce, up to a 
given limit. The food is then donated to low- 
cost popular restaurants, nongovernmental 
social assistance organizations serving vulnerable 
populations, or the federal government's emer­
gency food stocks. In 2009 the National School 
Meals Program adopted a policy of requiring 
public schools to allocate at least 30 percent of 
food expenditures to purchasing food directly 
from local family farmers. Thus, PAA is linked 
with other programs in other sectors, simul­
taneously supporting family farmers and local 
development and feeding populations at risk of 
hunger and food insecurity.
The PAA is under the jurisdiction of the MDS 
but is operated in partnership with the Ministry 
of Agrarian Development and the National Food 
Provisioning Company [Companhia Nacional de 
Abastecimento, or CONAB] of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Representatives of these three 
ministries compose the Interministerial Mana­
gerial Committee of PAA, together with repre­
sentatives from the Ministry of Economics, the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget, and the Minis­
try of Education. The program has various 
modalities of operation, which are often per­
ceived locally as being different programs. The 
responsible sectors at the municipal level vary 
depending on the program modality, local insti­
tutional arrangements, and source of the initia­
tive, typically involving the Departments of 
Agriculture, Social Assistance, or, more 
recently, Education. If more than one modality 
of the program is operating in a municipality 
under the responsibility of different depart­
ments, there are currently no structures in place 
to induce them to coordinate their efforts.
Food banks, community kitchens, and low-cost 
popular restaurants receive donations from the 
PAA and are also federally supported initiatives 
that compose the SISAN. Like the PAA, they 
depend on diverse local institutional arrange­
ments for their operation, typically being oper­
ated by municipal governments, nongovern­
mental organizations [NGOs],3 or even private 
companies.
Although the law stipulates an important role 
for NGOs in the SISAN, this presents both 
challenges and opportunities. The government 
has successfully partnered with national, 
regional, and local NGOs to strengthen and 
expand preexisting local FNS initiatives such as 
food banks, community kitchens, and popular 
restaurants, as well as the construction of rain­
water catchment cisterns in the semi-arid north­
east. However, the lack of an adequate legal 
framework for public funding of NGOs is a 
constraint to this partnership, and the diversity 
of partner organizations at the local level poses 
a dilemma for government control of the 
programs.
This flexible approach to decentralized program 
management has the advantage of respecting 
preexisting local processes, conforming to the 
diversity of local arrangements and initiatives 
arising from different sectors, and avoiding the 
imposition of a rigid institutional structure that 
may attribute responsibility to government offi­
cials who are less engaged in or committed to 
the issue. On the other hand, as alluded to 
earlier, such an approach poses a tremendous 
challenge with respect to program control and 
monitoring. Equally daunting is the difficulty of 
coordinating and integrating these initiatives and 
others at the local level to compose a FNS 
system.
A 2007 study conducted in 15 metropolitan 
areas in Brazil identified the following impedi­
ments to local management of FNS policy [MDS 
2008]:
3 In this text, the term "nongovernmental organi­
zation" is used to refer to national and regional 
organizations as well as smaller, local nonprofits 
[including churches] that provide social assistance and 
educational services.
• Programs were being implemented by differ­
ent government sectors’—or even the same 
sector—in a nonintegrated manner and with 
little relationship to the larger objective of 
food and nutrition security.
• Very few state and municipal governments 
had coordinating bodies to oversee the 
integration of FNS programs and policies.
• There was little correspondence between the 
planning of FNS policy and operational and 
budgetary processes.
• FNS actions were not being monitored and 
evaluated.
• Municipal governments were not investing 
in FNS actions and human resources [most 
of the resources invested in FNS are from 
federal sources],
• Municipal decision makers did not consider 
FNS policy a priority.
• Government decision makers and civil 
society lacked understanding and awareness 
of the theme of FNS.
• There were few municipal FNS advisory 
councils formed to participate in FNS policy 
making and help coordinate and monitor 
actions.
• There was little dialogue between the 
municipal and state levels on the issue of 
FNS policy.
The strategy to guarantee food and nutrition 
security in Brazil, the directives for imple­
mentation of the SISAN, and the challenges 
facing policy makers responsible for its imple­
mentation raise several policy issues.
Policy Issues
Defining the Best Operational Structure 
for an Open, Intersectoral FNS System
Implementing the SISAN will require an opera­
tional network built on the infrastructure and 
public services associated with existing FNS pro­
grams and actions in various sectors, including 
actions being carried out by nongovernmental 
partners. Laws applying to many of the individ­
ual programs that compose FNS policy specify
the responsible governmental departments at 
the local level, but no single department or sec­
tor is responsible for FNS policy as a whole. 
Who should be in charge of such an inter­
sectoral policy? What is the best managerial 
arrangement? What are the mechanisms for 
coordinating the components of this open sys­
tem? What structures should be promoted at 
the local level to get sectors with little or no 
history of collaboration to work together in an 
integrated manner?
Given that the SISAN has various centers of 
power in different sectors and levels of govern­
ment, coordinating bodies capable of mobilizing 
the network and promoting the equitable distri­
bution of resources play an essential role. One 
mechanism of coordination is the national 
CONSEA, which carries out this role through 
dialogue and negotiated agreements among 
representatives of government and civil society. 
Its effectiveness has yet to be replicated at the 
state and local levels, however, where the com­
position and institutional location of municipal 
FNS advisory councils often prevent them from 
playing an effective role in intersectoral policy 
formulation and implementation [Maluf 2008],
The other established coordinating body at the 
federal governmental level is the CAISAN, 
responsible for developing, implementing, and 
monitoring the National FNS Plan based on 
directives emanating from the CONSEA. The 
operational structure within state and municipal 
governments, however, is poorly defined and 
currently depends on the diversity of local insti­
tutional arrangements described earlier. The sec­
tor that takes the lead in municipal and state 
FNS policy tends to determine the shape that 
policy will take—which dimensions will be 
prioritized and how they will be transformed 
into integrated, intersectoral actions. Local 
processes have been respected up to now, and 
as a consequence there is little standardization 
among states and municipalities.
To join the SISAN, states and municipalities 
must meet several conditions outlined in the 
2010 decree. These conditions include the for­
mation of intersectoral governmental bodies to 
coordinate FNS policy and FNS advisory coun­
cils modeled after the national CONSEA. Cur­
rently, all but three state governments have 
officially committed to joining the SISAN by
fulfilling the requirements within one year, 
including formation of intersectoral govern­
mental bodies, and eight have already met 
conditions for immediate affiliation. Only a 
handful of cities have governmental coordinating 
bodies. While all states currently have FNS 
advisory councils, these vary considerably in 
their level of effectiveness, and a relatively small 
percentage of municipalities have formed such 
councils.
States and municipalities seeking to become part 
of the SISAN are required to develop a FNS 
plan within one year of signing the agreement. 
National FNS policy makers caution against fol­
lowing a standardized recipe for these plans, 
arguing that the building of decentralized FNS 
systems should be locally defined and negotiated 
based on local political, social, and institutional 
conditions [MDS 2008],
The theme of food security continues to 
perplex policy makers, however, particularly at 
the local level, and they often do not see how 
their own FNS-related actions fit into the bigger 
picture and relate to those being carried out in 
other sectors. Thus, instruments are needed to 
promote a shared conceptual framework that 
integrates the many dimensions of FNS and 
promotes intersectoral management of actions 
as diverse as buying food from family farmers, 
emergency food assistance, nutrition education, 
and income-generation activities.
State and municipal governments must be en­
couraged to strengthen their ties with non­
governmental partners engaged in FNS activities 
and to support existing networks and initiatives 
to improve integration of activities within a 
given territory. However, the imposition of ob­
ligations by the government on nongovern­
mental partners poses a unique dilemma. 
Whereas some partners rely heavily on public 
resources to carry out their actions, presumably 
giving the government some leverage, many do 
not.
Defining the Roles of the Three Levels of 
Government
The challenges of an intersectoral approach are 
compounded by decentralized decision making, 
as well as the open nature of the FNS system. 
While the federal government requires a means
of implementing FNS policy and programs and 
monitoring them to inform decision making at 
the national level, the specific obligations of 
national, state, and municipal governments have 
yet to be established. In addition, the limits 
defined by the federative pact in Brazil confer a 
reasonable degree of autonomy on states and 
municipalities.
Under the federalist constitution, municipalities 
are not obligated to carry out policies or follow 
federal program standards except in the health 
and education sectors. One instrument used to 
resolve this dilemma consists of joint manage­
ment agreements between the federal govern­
ment and municipal governments. The majority 
of the government programs mentioned, in­
cluding the BFP, are operated by local govern­
ments based on signed agreements with the 
MDS that establish roles and responsibilities for 
implementation of the programs as well as 
minimum institutional standards for program 
operation.
However, the political-institutional difficulties 
faced by a large share of Brazil's municipalities 
can have important consequences for the SISAN 
and its local-level programs. Financial and human 
resources and the administrative capacity to 
plan, implement, and monitor FNS policy and 
programs vary considerably among regions, 
states, and cities. Federal and state support 
[financial, technical, and political] will be neces­
sary to build capacity and to address the often 
complex local processes that contribute to 
inequitable access to public programs and 
actions.
Local political will is essential to the successful 
planning and implementation of food security 
actions, but some state and local governments 
are resistant to supporting policies that are per­
ceived as being highly politicized and associated 
with the incumbent political party. Thus, 
mechanisms must be found to overcome the 
politicization of the issue and promote the 
participation of state and local governments in 
the SISAN.
A specific challenge posed by decentralization in 
the context of the SISAN is the implementation 
of an institutional arrangement to promote 
intersectoral dialogue among decision makers 
and program managers at the three levels of
government in an integrated manner. The 
Unified Health System, for example, has trilateral 
and bilateral commissions that promote dialogue 
among state, municipal, and federal decision 
makers and where pacts are made with respect 
to goals and objectives. A similar arrangement 
will be in place in the case of the SISAN, but the 
voluntary and trans-sectoral nature of the sys­
tem will make it more difficult to agree on goals 
and instruments.
Monitoring FNS Policy in an Open 
System
Another reason it is important to promote 
awareness and understanding of the concept of 
FNS is to enable state and local government 
officials to develop integrated, intersectoral 
actions, including monitoring. It is important to 
define an intersectoral conceptual framework 
and methodology for collecting information on 
FNS policy and programs that integrates data 
from diverse sectors in a way that is useful for 
federal, state, and municipal decision makers.
The national CONSEA has defined indicators to 
monitor each of the seven dimensions of FNS 
presented in Table I using data that are readily 
available at the national level. Not all of these 
indicators, however, are disaggregated by state, 
region, and municipality, and few are available at 
a submunicipal level, which would be of par­
ticular interest to local policy makers. State and 
municipal-level indicators will need to be 
defined, as well as the degree of standardization 
of such indicators among states and munici­
palities.
Monitoring and evaluation are advanced at the 
national level, but the culture of data collection 
to inform program management at the local 
level, as well as the capacity and infrastructure 
needed to do so, vary considerably from one 
municipal government to another. Local 
governments are often lacking in experience, 
trained staff, and other resources necessary to 
plan, implement, and monitor FNS policy and 
programs.
The monitoring challenge is further complicated 
by the constellation of NGOs that partner with 
local government to provide FNS programs. 
This constellation differs from one region and 
city to another and includes many organizations
with no prior obligation to collect information 
on their activities and provide it to the govern­
ment. Local nonprofit organizations, in particu­
lar, tend to have limited capacity to collect and 
provide information on their FNS-related activi­
ties and the populations they serve.
Stakeholders
People at Risk of Hunger and Food 
Insecurity
The most important stakeholders are people at 
risk of hunger and food insecurity, whose 
vulnerability should decline with the implemen­
tation of an effective system to guarantee their 
right to adequate food. People with uncertain 
access to enough food of good quality, whether 
because of low or unstable incomes, inadequate 
social support, crop damage, or other situations 
of acute or chronic crisis, would be able to 
enter the FNS system in one sector and be 
referred to services in other sectors. Ideally they 
would have a voice in FNS policy through 
municipal FNS advisory councils, although pro­
moting the representation of the most vulnera­
ble population groups, like the homeless, 
indigenous populations, poor families in rural 
areas, and residents of urban slums, remains a 
challenge.
People who are already in the system by virtue 
of participating in existing food and nutrition 
security programs would benefit from increasing 
integration among the programs, which should 
result in more efficient bureaucratic processes 
and a better referral system capable of linking 
them to services in other sectors.
Smallholder Family Farmers
Implementation of an effective FNS system 
would create opportunities for smallholder fam­
ily farmers by strengthening intersectoral im­
plementation and management of the PAA. This 
change would link small farmers more effectively 
to potential recipients of their produce, such as 
the school meals program, social assistance or­
ganizations, CONAB, and local markets, and 
improve their incomes. They would stand to 
receive more support for their associations and 
cooperatives and more technical assistance to 
improve their farming techniques.
Local Social Assistance Organizations 
Associated with FNS Initiatives and 
Programs
The nongovernmental partners in the system - 
such as orphanages, homes for the elderly and 
victims of domestic violence, and organizations 
that provide emergency food assistance and job 
training and promote income-generation activi­
ties—stand to benefit from being part of an 
integrated system, but they may have to con­
form to certain conditions in order to be 
included. Although they could lose some degree 
of autonomy in exchange for receiving benefits, 
they would have a greater voice and enlarged 
network through the creation of local FNS 
advisory councils.
Local Government Leaders: Elected 
Officials and Appointed Heads of 
Relevant Sectors
Much of the onus for implementing the SISAN 
will fall on local government leaders. Their 
leadership, commitment, networking capability, 
and political savvy are central to its success. 
However, social pressure and inducements 
through federal funds are still required to give 
FNS political priority at this level. Local 
governments will be asked to invest more time 
and resources, but the integration of programs 
should improve the efficiency and synergy of 
their actions. They could benefit from a more 
fluid relationship with state and federal govern­
ments and an influx of more resources. For 
some, their political careers could be influenced 
by the degree of success of FNS policy imple­
mentation and its effects on the local 
population.
State-Level Leaders
Government leaders and heads of relevant sec­
tors at the state level will also be asked to invest 
more time and resources to implement the 
SISAN, with the same expectation that the effi­
ciency and synergy of their actions will improve 
over the long run, benefiting the population 
they serve. They will need to reinforce col­
laboration both horizontally [among sectors] 
and vertically [with federal and municipal 
governments]. Like their counterparts at the 
local level, their political capital could be 
improved or diminished, depending on how
their actions are judged. State-level leaders of 
social movements and organizations may or may 
not forfeit some level of autonomy in exchange 
for more formal integration in the SISAN and a 
greater voice through participation in state FNS 
advisory councils.
Decision Makers at the Federal Level
Ministers, secretaries, department heads, and 
program managers involved in FNS policy at the 
federal level stand to gain considerably from 
implementation of the SISAN. In addition to 
having a defined structure to work within and a 
higher level of institutionalization for their ac­
tions, they would have a stronger, more 
organized, and integrated decentralized base. 
State and municipal governments would be 
better equipped to share responsibility for FNS 
policy, implement it locally, and provide the 
feedback needed at the federal level to inform 
policy making and program management. Such 
benefits should compensate for increased de­
mands on their time and resources early on.
Civil Society Engaged in the Issue of 
Hunger and FNS
The CONSEA would benefit from capacity 
building and increased sharing of responsibility 
at the state and local levels, but it will also no 
doubt be called upon to assume additional 
responsibilities. The experience of the CONSEA 
has shown that FNS councils and other spaces 
for social participation are more effective where 
social movements and civil society organizations 
are well organized. Thus, while they stand to 
benefit from the creation and improved effec­
tiveness of state and municipal FNS advisory 
councils, social movements and organizations 
will need to rise to the occasion and take advan­
tage of the opportunity to have a greater voice 
in the definition of FNS policy.
Policy Options
Defining the Best Operational Structure 
for an Open, Intersectoral FNS System
Policy options with respect to governance of the 
SISAN must address [1] the best institutional 
location for the CAISAN at the federal level; [2] 
mechanisms to induce the formation of
intersectoral FNS chambers within state and 
local governments; [3] mechanisms to induce the 
creation of municipal FNS advisory councils and 
improve the effectiveness of existing state and 
municipal FNS advisory councils; (4] obligations 
of NGOs who want to be part of the SISAN 
and legal parameters for receiving public fund­
ing; and [5] instruments to promote a shared 
understanding of the dimensions and inter­
sectoral nature of FNS policy among govern­
ment decision makers and their nongovern­
mental partners, as well as induce integration of 
FNS actions in different sectors.
Currently the CAISAN is located institutionally 
within the MDS, the main ministry responsible 
for FNS policy. Because this arrangement could 
challenge its legitimacy in the eyes of the other 
ministries, as well as their commitment to inter­
sectoral goals and programs—with repercussions 
at state and local levels as well—one policy 
option would be to move the CAISAN out of 
the MDS and locate it within the Executive 
Office, like the CONSEA.
Another policy choice is related to the forma­
tion of intersectoral FNS chambers and FNS 
advisory councils at the state and municipal 
governmental levels. While the federal govern­
ment cannot obligate states and cities to create 
these coordinating bodies, it is a condition for 
receiving federal funding for certain FNS 
actions, written into the joint management 
agreements. Some standards regarding the 
structure and attributes of these coordinating 
bodies could be included in the agreements, 
although this introduces the risk of constraining 
innovation and imposing structures that do not 
respect local institutional arrangements.
Joint written agreements could also be used to 
specify the obligations of NGOs who want to 
be part of the SISAN, although it would be 
necessary to define the most appropriate 
governmental level for drawing up such agree­
ments. Some NGOs carry out actions only at 
the municipal level, whereas others are regional 
or even national. Again, the federal government 
(MDS] could provide guidelines for agreements 
at state and municipal levels to introduce a de­
gree of standardization, but care must be taken 
to avoid standardized approaches that interfere 
with local arrangements and innovation.
Various options exist for promoting under­
standing of the intersectoral nature of FNS 
policy and programs and inducing integrated 
management. Written agreements between the 
MDS and local governments often include 
conditions that encourage integration of MDS 
programs at the local level. In the case of the 
BFP, for example, the agreements specify that 
municipalities will prioritize BFP beneficiaries for 
other relevant services, including income- 
generation and job-training programs [see 
Lindert et al. 2007 for an excellent discussion of 
the governance structures of the BFP], Similar 
inducements could be included in other joint 
management agreements related to FNS policy.
State and municipal FNS conferences could play 
an important role in promoting understanding 
of the intersectoral nature of FNS policy and 
programs by encouraging local debate. Federal 
and state governments and the CONSEA could 
also play a more direct role by promoting such 
conferences and providing training to local deci­
sion makers and other stakeholders. Mechanisms 
for states and municipalities to learn from each 
other's successful initiatives could be created, 
and partnerships with universities could be pro­
moted to carry out capacity-building activities.
Defining the Roles of the Three Levels of 
Government
Defining the roles and responsibilities of the 
different levels of government also involves set­
ting the right balance between standardization 
and flexibility and between obligation and 
inducement. What actions should state and 
municipal governments be induced to take, and 
how strong should the inducements be? Also, 
how might inequalities in institutional, political, 
and financial capacity be addressed?
The federalist system concedes political auton­
omy to state and municipal governments, but 
this arrangement does not translate into a lack 
of obligation to implement policies. The incor­
poration of the human right to adequate food 
into the Brazilian Constitution in 2009 implies 
mechanisms for demanding that this right be 
guaranteed at the local level. Options include 
civil law suits and public hearings, as well as 
organizing and educational activities to mobilize 
the population to demand access to FNS 
programs not available in their area.
The federal government's relation with state and 
municipal governments, which is characterized in 
the National FNS Law as “collaboration," re­
quires instruments to formalize state and 
municipal participation in the national system. 
Thus, while the law does not obligate states and 
municipalities to participate, state governors will 
receive protocols of compliance from the 
CAISAN outlining the steps required to partici­
pate in the national system and the cor­
responding incentives. Joint management agree­
ments will need to be drawn up between the 
federal government and state and municipal 
governments to establish roles and responsibili­
ties for implementation of the programs, as well 
as minimum institutional standards for program 
implementation and monitoring.
Several fields of action naturally fall under state 
responsibility. One is state-level policy and 
implementation of programs in areas that are 
relevant to FNS and would stand to benefit 
from a more concerted regional approach, such 
as agricultural production, education, health, 
and nutrition. State governments could play a 
key role in promoting regional initiatives and 
interaction among municipalities. Another field 
of action, already mentioned, consists of train­
ing and educational activities to increase aware­
ness and understanding of the issue and capacity 
building to design, implement, and monitor FNS 
policy at the local level.
An effective model for coordinating SISAN 
actions at the federal, state, and municipal levels 
consists of the trilateral and bilateral commis­
sions that currently play an important role in 
the Unified Health System. In the case of FNS, 
however, these commissions will need to be 
composed of empowered representatives from 
the various sectors that interface with FNS. 
Pacts regarding policy goals and objectives, as 
well as managerial and financial responsibilities at 
each level, could be negotiated and agreed upon 
by commission members.
Conditions attached to federal funding of pro­
grams at the state and local levels have strong 
potential to induce arrangements perceived to 
be beneficial for the institutionalization of the 
SISAN. However, most of the conditions men­
tioned—such as conformity of state and local 
FNS governing bodies to certain standards, 
periodic municipal and state FNS conferences,
and reporting of specified program information 
in a standardized format to the federal govern­
ment—would require mechanisms of financial 
and technical support from the federal level to 
state and municipal governments to help them 
meet such conditions. This points to important 
policy choices regarding shared responsibility 
among the governmental levels for the costs, 
especially in light of the unequal institutional, 
financial, and political capacities of state and 
local governments.
Thus, another key policy option emerges per­
taining to the federal government's resource 
allocation priorities in the construction of the 
SISAN. Options include prioritizing [1] states and 
municipalities with better administrative capabili­
ties and/or experience in FNS policy, which may 
be more likely to make efficient use of the 
resources; [2] regions, states, or municipalities 
with higher rates of poverty and food inse­
curity; [3] states and municipalities with greater 
proven interest in implementing FNS policy; or 
[4] those with a history of resistance or lack of 
interest. Another policy choice would be to 
stipulate that states and municipalities with more 
resources pay a larger share of the public 
investment in FNS actions than poorer ones.
Monitoring FNS Policy in an Open 
System
Any discussion of a monitoring system implies a 
conceptual framework of what is to be moni­
tored—an issue that is linked to understanding 
of and consensus on the concept of FNS. Policy 
choices regarding monitoring are again related 
to the tensions between central and local 
control.
Promotion of a culture of monitoring, and defi­
nition of state and municipal-level indicators, 
could be done with varying degrees of involve­
ment from the federal level, either directly from 
the government or through the CONSEA in its 
social oversight role. The federal government 
could define a minimum level of information 
needed at the national level to monitor pro­
grams. Policy questions concern the degree of 
standardization of such indicators among states 
and municipalities as well as mechanisms for 
sharing the costs of training and infrastructure 
needed to collect and manage the information.
It may be useful to adopt some form of cen­
tralized, computer-based FNS information sys­
tem that would allow state and municipal 
governments to periodically enter data and that 
would ideally be integrated with existing systems 
in the different sectors. Such a system could 
encourage adoption of certain indicators and 
improve integrated management of FNS actions. 
NGOs that seek to be part of the SISAN could 
be required to enter data as well, as a condition 
for receiving funding or donations.
One instrument that has proven extremely use­
ful in the context of the BFP is the Decentralized 
Management Index [tndice de Cestao Descen- 
tralizada, IGD], a composite index made up of 
four indicators identified by the MDS as key to 
the quality of program implementation.4 It en­
courages municipalities to monitor and prioritize 
certain actions by providing financial incentives 
for municipalities with higher scores. It is also 
useful for identifying municipalities experiencing 
managerial difficulties, which then receive addi­
tional technical support to improve the quality 
of program implementation.
The BFP has additional on-line systems that 
facilitate integrated management of data, such as 
the Conditionalities Management System and 
another more comprehensive system currently 
being implemented to improve intersectoral 
management—horizontal as well as vertical— 
called the BFP Management System.
It is worth noting that the federal government is 
motivated to invest in sophisticated information 
management systems for the BFP because of the 
program's size. Other programs that compose 
the Zero Hunger strategy, like the PAA and 
food banks, represent much smaller budget 
items and are also more structurally complex. A 
less costly option could be the development of 
information management software programs
4 The four indicators are [1] the percentage of eligible families on the Unified Social Assistance database system [used to register families for the BFP and other benefits] with complete and consistent records; [2] the percentage of families whose records have been updated in the past two years; [3] the per­centage of children receiving BPF benefits with com­plete information on school attendance; and [4] the percentage of families with complete information on health conditions.
that could be downloaded by municipal gov­
ernments. Such programs could help promote, 
standardize, and facilitate the collection of in­
formation considered key for monitoring FNS 
policy.
However, even if on-line information manage­
ment systems or software were developed, most 
local governments and their nongovernmental 
partners would need technical and financial sup­
port to improve their capacity to monitor and 
provide information. This issue refers back to 
the question of which level of government 
should be responsible for providing such assis­
tance. It is clear that the policy issues and 
options outlined here are highly interrelated, a 
situation that reinforces the appropriateness of a 
systems approach to food and nutrition security 
policy.
Assignment
The CAISAN was charged with formulating the 
first National Food and Nutrition Security Plan5 
and the promotion of state and municipal food 
and nutrition security plans. Although the 
federal government is committed to decen­
tralized control and recognizes that too many 
rules and regulations can interfere with the 
flexibility needed to adapt to local political- 
institutional arrangements, it requires instru­
ments to fulfill its mandate to implement the law 
and monitor actions at the local level. What 
directives and instruments would you recom­
mend be included in the national plan to meet 
this challenge?
5 The National Food and Nutrition Security Plan for 
2012-2015 was launched in August 2011 and can be accessed [in Portuguese] athttp: / / www.mds.gov.br / gestaodainformacao / bibliotec a / secretaria-nacional-de-seguranca-alimentar-e- 
nutricional-sesan / livros / plano-nacional-de-seguranca- alimentar-e-nutricional-2012-2015/plano-nacional-de- seguranca-alimentar-e-nutricional-2012-2015.
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